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Abstract Surprisingly effortless is the human capacity
known as ‘‘mentalizing’’, i.e., the ability to explain and
predict the behavior of others by attributing to them inde-
pendent mental states, such as beliefs, desires, emotions or
intentions. This capacity is, among other factors, depen-
dent on the correct anticipation of the dynamics of facially
expressed emotions based on our beliefs and experience.
Important information about the neural processes involved
in mentalizing can be derived from dynamic recordings of
neural activity such as the EEG. We here exemplify how
the so-called Bayesian probabilistic models can help us to
model the neural dynamic involved in the perception of
clips that evolve from neutral to emotionally laden faces.
Contrasting with conventional models, in Bayesian models,
probabilities can be used to dynamically update beliefs
based on new incoming information. Our results show that
a reproducible model of the neural dynamic involved in the
appraisal of facial expression can be derived from the
grand mean ERP over five subjects. One of the two models
used to predict the individual subject dynamic yield correct
estimates for four of the five subjects analyzed. These
results encourage the future use of Bayesian formalism to
build more detailed models able to describe the single trial
dynamic.
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Introduction
The ability to infer the mental states (beliefs, thoughts,
and intentions) of others in order to predict and explain
their behavior depends on cues extracted from many
modalities. The tone of the voice, the gestures or the
direction of others gaze are examples of the cues that
needs to be combined to correctly infer the feelings of the
person that we are interacting with. The accurate detec-
tion of others feelings is therefore a first step to anticipate
others reactions. From a Bayesian perspective, these two
problems, i.e., detection and prediction are not indepen-
dent. Errors made in the prediction step can be used to
evaluate the accuracy of the detection and refine it in a
dynamical process. Also, depending on our present
inferences (part of our internal beliefs) we might decide
to differently weight the cues to better update our esti-
mate of the others mental states. Consequently, the idea
that the Bayesian formalism can be used to appropriately
model the process of ‘‘mentalizing’’ or the way in which
the brain combines multisensory cues for mental state
detection is starting to emerge [7, 9].
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Some authors have proposed that the brain’s mirror-
neuron system [12] is at the core of the mentalizing pro-
cess. The idea that there is a mirror system in the brain
arises from the observation that the same brain areas are
activated when we observe another person experiencing an
emotion as when we experience the same emotion our-
selves (see e.g. [19]). The brain’s mirror system might help
to explain how the first inference about others states is
created. Emotions are contagious, i.e., the observers tend to
imitate and feel the emotions of the persons they are
interacting with. For example, through the observation of
others facial expressions we can experience the emotional
states of another person and help to shape and update our
beliefs about his/her feelings [15].
How can then Bayesian decision theory frame the
mentalizing process? A hidden state which is not directly
observable, the agent’s feelings, has to be inferred by the
observer on the basis of new upcoming evidence extracted
from multisensory cues. The new cues are combined with
the present estimate of the state (that depends upon a
combination of our experience and the incoming informa-
tion) to update the beliefs in a sort of iterative procedure.
As such Bayesian formalism provides an elegant solution
to the problem of mentalizing by predicting that we are
constantly assigning probabilities to our internally stored
belief about others mental states and updating such beliefs
in the measure that new information is obtained. This will
give to the neural system the capacity to assign a given
probability to transitions in others emotional states
according to a combination of experience in social com-
munication and incoming information.
While the model is sound, the challenge is to demon-
strate that the brain actually relies on a Bayesian
framework to perform the process of mentalizing. Such
evidence can only arise from trying to model neural data
using this framework and evaluating each of the many
multiple models of the same process that can be accom-
modated within the broad Bayesian formalism. For
instances, the amount of multisensory cues that can be
added as variables to model the mentalizing problem is so
large that might quickly lead to mathematically untreatable
problems. All these factors explain why the Bayesian
formalism remains as an appealing theory to model men-
talizing without formal experimental support.
The widely distributed character of the mirror system,
not tied to any particular brain region, suggest that evi-
dences in favor of the Bayesian framework should rely on
global rather than local measures of neural activity. One
global measure of neural activity able to capture the full
dynamic of neural processes at millisecond resolution is the
scalp EEG. Therefore, to evaluate the adequacy of
Bayesian formalism we carried out the analysis of EEG
data recorded from five healthy volunteers during passive
viewing of clips showing dynamic expression sequences.
In the clips an initially neutral face was gradually trans-
formed into an emotional face either portraying a happy
(towards to happy) or an angry (towards to angry)
expression. This is a particularly interesting experiment
since contagion is considered a first step in mentalizing [7].
EMG activity recorded on the dataset analyzed here
demonstrated that subjects covertly imitated the facial
expressions they were observing [2].
Here, two concrete Bayesian models are proposed to
model one specific component of the mentalizing process,
i.e., inferring other feelings from facial expressions. It is
assumed that the EEG dynamics contains information
about how the observer updates his/her beliefs about the
agent’s feelings. The models are built from the grand
average data and its capability to reproduce the dynamic is
evaluated by their possibilities to predict/identify the class
of facial expressions observed by the individual subjects.
Note that this goal is totally different from most neuro-
imaging studies that have addressed the neural substrates of
mentalizing (see e.g., [1, 14] for reviews).
Material and Methods
Subjects and Recordings
Five healthy volunteers (2 males, mean age = 26.1 years,
age range 22–35 years) were selected for the analysis
presented here. For a more detailed description of the
experiment, the grand-mean ERPs and the EMG see [2].
Movie clips of dynamic facial expressions (anger or
happy) were generated in E-Prime using morphed pictures
[4]. The selected faces correspond to 10 different identities.
Subjects passively viewed 5 blocks of 50 movies each.
Each block contained 25 clips that evolved from neutral to
happy faces and 25 clips that evolved from neutral to angry
faces. Each clip lasted 1,460 ms. Clips were separated by
an average 4 s ITI.
EEG and EMG data were simultaneously recorded
during the task on a darkened room. EEG data were sam-
pled at 2,048 Hz using a 64-channel Biosemi ActiveTwo
system with sintered Ag–AgCl active electrodes. The
analysis of the data was carried out using custom built in
software programmed in Matlab. The data was down-
sampled to 512 Hz before posterior analysis.
Bayesian Models
In this section we formulate two Bayesian models for the
EEG sequence maps recorded during the observation of the
movie-clips displaying either happy or angry facial expres-
sions. The models consider the scalp maps topography as a
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whole rather than the independent dynamic of each elec-
trode. The idea is to build the models based on the grand
mean over subjects and to evaluate the goodness of the
models by testing how well they describe the dynamics on
the mean ERP of the single subjects. Importantly, the pri-
mary goal of these models is the description of the dynamic
of the process allowing, as a secondary goal, the identifica-
tion of the class (angry or happy face) generating the data.
This is to be contrasted with pattern recognition methods that
focus mainly in the classification of unseen data.
In the following we will denote the potential map by V
and the state variable by X. Subscripts will be used to
denote the value at a single time point (Vt) or set of time
points (V0:t).
The first model (B1) aims at describing the temporal
dynamics of state variable and can be applied to the EEG
maps as follows. Given the EEG maps sequence Vt,
t = 0,1,2,...T, the labeling of its corresponding facial
expression class can be represented as a temporally accu-
mulated posterior probability at time t, p(Xt|V0:t), where the
state variable Xt represents the class label of a map
(towards happy or towards angry). Assuming that the
measurement Vt is completely determined by current state
Xt, the estimation of the class Xt , {2} corresponding to
the two classes of movie clips (i.e. happy and angry) can be
obtained from a Bayesian perspective in the following way:
pðXt=V0:tÞ ¼ pðVt=XtÞpðXt=V0:t1Þ
pðVt=V0:t1Þ ð1Þ
Assuming conditional independence of the state variable
Xt with respect to past measurements Vt, t = 0,1,2,...T-1
given Xt-1 is equivalent to say that the state Xt is complete
[16]. In other words, completeness entails that knowledge of
past states or measurements carry no additional information
that would help us to predict the future more accurately. We
would note that this definition of completeness does not
require the future to be a deterministic function of the state
but just that no variables prior to Xt may influence the
stochastic evolution of future states, unless this dependence
is mediated through the state Xt. In our particular case, this
means, the perception of the class (clip) at time t depends on
the class at t-1 but not on the EEG maps previous to Vt. In
mathematical parlance it is expressed by the following
equation:
pðXt=Xt1; V0:t1Þ ¼ pðXt=Xt1Þ ð2Þ
Then the accumulated prior probability of Xt given the
past measurements can be computed from:
pðXt=V0:t1Þ ¼
Z
pðXt=Xt1ÞpðXt1=V0:t1ÞdXt1 ð3Þ
That allows rewriting Eq. 1 as a Bayes filter algorithm
without control data:
pðXt=V0:tÞ ¼
Z
pðXt1=V0:t1Þ pðVt=XtÞpðXt=Xt1Þ
pðVt=V0:t1Þ dXt1
ð4Þ
We can define the initial probability p(X0|V0) = p(X0) =
1/N, where N = 2 is the number of classes and estimate the
p(Vt|Xt) and the p(Xt|Xt-1) from a given data set (learning
set). Then the model given by Eq. 4 can be applied
recursively to compute the state variable at each time point.
We would note that in this model, the only (and weak)
connection between successive scalp maps and/or states is
the one induced by Eq. 2 and thus this model ignores
potential temporal dependencies between scalp maps.
The second Bayesian model proposed here (B2), is a
combination of a Bayesian classifier with a law describing
temporal dependencies within the class. That is, model B2
uses the output of previous time point to estimate the state
at current time point. As for previous model we start from
Bayes equation relating the state Xt and the observation Vt
at current time point:
pðXt=VtÞ ¼ pðVt=XtÞpðXtÞ
pðVtÞ ð5Þ
Now defining p(Xt) = p(Xt-1|Vt-1) we can rewrite (5) as
pðXt=VtÞ ¼ pðVt=XtÞpðXt1=Vt1Þ
pðVtÞ ð6Þ
where p(X0|V0) = p(X0) = 1/N, with N = 2 is the number
of classes and p(Vt|Xt) can be determined from a given data
set (learning set).
Equation 6 defines a recursive process to compute the
posterior probability of the class label at each time point
using as prior probability the output of previous time point.
This could be interpreted as accumulation of evidences
where the new decisions in favor or against one of the
classes are proportional to the past experiences.
Implementation
In this paper, the learning set is defined as a temporal
window selected from the two grand means over subjects
for the happy and angry classes. The temporal window
used for the learning set was the interval between 500 and
1,500 ms. From 500 ms onwards the EMG responses to the
analyzed facial expressions was significantly different for
both muscles: the zygomaticus major (ZM) that elevates
the lips during a smile, and the corrugator supercillii (CS)
that knits the eyebrows during a frown [2]. Consequently,
at period selected for the learning set the subjects already
identified and mimicked the observed facial expression.
The probability p(Vt|Xt) used in both models was defined
as a Gaussian distribution with means and covariance
matrix computed from the learning set , that is,
280 Brain Topogr (2008) 20:278–283
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pðVt=Xt ¼ kÞ ¼ g  expððVt  lkÞ0RkðVt  lkÞ ð7Þ
where k = 1,2 denotes the class and g is a normalization
constant. Note also that the terms in the denominator of
Eqs. 4 and 6 do not need to be computed explicitly because
they do not involve the state variable. Mean and covariance
matrices for each class were computed as the maximum
likelihood estimators. Transition probability in Eqs. 3 and 4
was computed from the output of Eq. 5 assuming p(Xt) =
1/N and the model (7) and using the grand means.
Grand mean for each movie clip class was computed as
the mean of the average evoked potential from the 5 sub-
jects. This EEG data was then used as training set to
compute the parameters of models B1 and B2.
The output of the method was defined as the class to
which the procedure converged after the whole sequence,
i.e., at 1,500 ms. Thus, we consider a correct identification
if the class identified at the end of the sequence is the
correct class, i.e., the probability observed at 1,500 ms is
larger than 0.5.
Results
Figure 1 depicts for each subject (row) the probability of
each class as a function of time using the Bayesian filter
algorithm of model B1. As can be seen the model fitting of
B1 to the individual subjects suggest a dynamic behavior.
The probabilities of correctly identifying the evolving to
happy clip when this was the actually shown clip substan-
tially vary over time. For subject 1, the probabilities of
identifying the current class are close to one over the whole
sequence and for both classes. The situation is different for
subject 3 (third row). For the case of evolving to happy clips
(left column) the probabilities remain close to 0.5 for nearly
the whole period and are close to zero at the end of the
sequence. This indicates that the model failed to identify the
correct class in this case. The model also fails for subjects
two and five during visualization of the evolving to angry
clips. According to our definition of correct identification
that considers the convergence at the end of the sequence,
this model B1 fails in capturing the correct perception of the
subjects in three out of ten situations.
Figure 2 depicts for each subject (row) the probability of
each class as a function of time using the recursive
Bayesian classifier of model B2. In this case, the model
assumes that the probability of observing a given class at
time t depends on the class observed at time t-1. This
assumption can be considered as more realistic given the
known similarities of maps on grand mean data.
The dynamics of this model on the single subject basis is
more rigid, i.e., exhibit less temporal variability. The model
is however able to identify the correct class of clips in 9 out of
10 situations studied. The model only fails to converge to the
correct class for the evolving to happy clip of subject number
three.
Discussion
We here present two different Bayesian temporal models that
aim to describe from EEG data how subjects dynamically
Fig. 1 Probability of the model B1 of predicting that class was happy
when the actual clip evolves to happy (left plot) or to predict that clip
was angry when the actual clip evolves towards angry (right).
Probabilities are displayed as a function of time (seconds) from clip
onset. One subject is depicted on each row. Probability values near to
one indicate that the correct class was identified for the subject
Fig. 2 Probability of the model B2 of predicting that class was happy
when the actual clip evolves to happy (left plot) or to predict that clip
was angry when the actual clip evolves towards angry (right).
Probability values near to one indicate that the correct class was
identified for the subject
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perceive or make inferences about others mental states from
their facial expressions. The second model B2 yielded a high
recognition rate (9/10) of the facial expression towards
which the clips evolved. This suggests that the mean ERP
used to train the model contains information which is con-
sistent at a single subject level. While model B2 assumes that
the present state of the class (i.e. the type of facial expression
being observed) depends explicitly only on previous state,
this induces a strong temporal dependency between con-
secutive scalp maps. The model also show a rigid temporal
dynamic that contradicts our expectancies about the exis-
tence of a sequence of perception states which transits from
uncertainty at the beginning of the sequence towards a
clearly defined percept at intermediate and final stages. On
the contrary, model B1 shows a more flexible dynamic but
fails to show good generalization properties since the rec-
ognition rates at the single subject level are lower (7/10).
None of the models is however able to provide a fully sat-
isfactory description of the dynamics of subjects perception.
The temporal evolution fails to show the transition from
uncertainty (probabilities near 0.5) about the facial expres-
sion towards which the clip will evolve to complete certainty
information around 500 ms (where the EMG data revealed
significant differences).
The differences between both models to describe the
individual temporal dynamic are due to their different
underlying assumptions. Model B2 assumes an explicit
dependency between the classes observed at consecutive
time points. This means, the probability that subjects
perception is a ‘‘towards to happy clip’’ depends not only
on current map but also on the class observed at previous
instant. On the other hand, model B1 includes temporal
dependencies during the computation of the transition
matrix. Consequently, model B1 assumes that state tran-
sitions detected from the grand mean should arise also at
the single subject level. The explicit incorporation of a
dynamic law inherited from the grand mean might explain
its variability and the slower temporal convergence
towards the correct class. In contrast model B2 yields faster
but rigid temporal behavior. Each model integrates the
temporal information differently. While B1 is mainly
dominated by previous time point, model B2 takes into
account all precedent results into the a priori probability,
then apparently little increases in the a priori probability
might yield strong posterior probabilities and thus faster
convergence.
We should mention, however, that the high recognition
rates achieved are encouraging to continue with the
refinement of Bayesian models in the study of neural
activity. The idea behind Bayesian probabilistic models
that accept uncertainty as a natural component of neural
processes is appealing. It might for example be used to
incorporate the influence of non-measurable internal states,
in perception which should ultimately lead to descriptions
at the single trial level.
The use of Bayesian/probabilistic models for EEG anal-
ysis and synthesis is at its infancy. Hitherto, most
applications of the Bayesian framework are oriented to the
solution of the electromagnetic inverse problem [3, 5, 8, 17]
and the introduction of temporal constraints to model sources
dynamic [6]. Bayesian models have been also applied to the
problem of classifying single trials within one or more
classes within the framework of Brain Computer Interfaces
[10, 13]. The goal of the models described here is, in a given
sense, more ambitious than the simple identification of the
correct class as in Brain Computer Interface or the seg-
mentation of neural data into stable mental states [11, 18].
The ultimate goal is to identify and characterize the dynamic
of a non-observable variable (subject’s internal perception
and prediction) from the measured EEG. To achieve such
ambitious goals, the models could be refined to explicitly
incorporate the temporal dependencies between scalp maps
and their transitions using the Bayesian formalism.
One interesting question to be explored in the future is if
the incorporation of multimodal cues could lead to better
but still mathematically treatable models of the mentalizing
process. The models developed here are restricted to the
problem of making inferences about others mental states on
the sole basis of facial expression. Therefore, future work
will focus on developing more sophisticated models that
consider a more complex dynamic and probably employ
auxiliary channels, e.g., EMG as control variables.
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